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The purpose of our article is to define how the FX debt of the private sector changes the impact of the exchange rate on the 
real economy: to identify the balance sheet channels through which depreciation of the exchange rate has a negative impact 
on GDP and the factors which determine whether the overall impact of depreciation will be contractionary or expansionary. 
In our analysis, we identified three balance sheet channels. Depreciation of the nominal exchange rate increases the debt 
burden of companies and households which are indebted in foreign currency and have no FX income, leading in turn to lower 
investments and consumption. Although the direct FX exposure of the banking sector is not significant, if banks face binding 
capital and/or liquidity constraints, changes in the exchange rate may have an indirect impact on the credit supply of banks 
through a number of channels.
Looking at the impact of a weaker exchange rate on growth, our calculations show that the effect of depreciation on the 
lending ability of the banking system is of key importance. If we only take into account the impact of the exchange rate on 
the balance sheets of the households and corporate sector, the impact on competitiveness is presumably stronger, but the 
impact of depreciation on household income and the profitability of companies with FX debts and no natural hedge will use 
up approximately 50% of the expansionary effect of increased competitiveness. However, if there is also a strong balance 
sheet adjustment in the banking sector, the overall impact of depreciation may well be contractionary. The effect of the 
exchange rate on the banks’ credit supply should, at least in such a strong form, be considered as a temporary phenomenon 
associated with the crisis. In parallel with the consolidation of the global financial environment and further improvement in 
the capital position and profit prospects of the banking sector, the credit supply channel is also expected to attenuate.
InTroDuCTIon
the international financial crisis that began in 2008 has 
changed our views significantly in respect of the room for 
manoeuvre in monetary policy. this was predominantly 
due to the Fx exposure of the private sector. Since the 
end of 2008, monetary policy has faced a major dilemma. 
although the outlook for the real economy and inflation 
have been pointing towards monetary easing for months, 
it has become questionable whether monetary policy is 
capable of conducting a counter-cyclical policy at all. in 
a  small  open  economy,  we  expect  exchange  rate 
depreciation as a result of monetary easing to improve 
the competitiveness of export companies and to generate 
GdP growth – at least over the short term. at the same 
time,  due  to  unhedged  Fx  debts,  depreciation  causes 
deterioration in the balance sheets of the private sector 
with Fx debts, which may lead to a decrease in capital 
investments  and  consumption  and  threaten  financial 
stability.  in  our  analysis,  we  seek  to  define  how  Fx 
lending changes the impact of the exchange rate on the 
real economy. We also seek to identify the balance sheet 
channels  through  which  depreciation  of  the  exchange 
rate  lowers  growth  and  the  factors  which  determine 
whether depreciation of the exchange rate has an overall 
positive or negative influence on growth.
the structure of the analysis is as follows. in chapter 1 we 
provide a brief overview of the literature on the consequences 
of Fx debt. based on the review of the empirical literature 
describing  the  experiences  of  previous  decades,  we  can 
conclude that Fx debt may significantly modify the impact 
which the exchange rate has on the real economy. chapter 
2 summarises the balance sheet channels that are relevant in 
hungary, through which depreciation of the exchange rate 
may impair the performance of the economy by affecting 
the  balance  sheet  of  economic  agents.  in  chapter  3  we 
provide  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  importance  of  the 
various  balance  sheet  channels  and  summarise  our  main 
conclusions.
*	The	views	expressed	in	this	article	are	those	of	the	author(s)	and	do	not	necessarily	reflect	the	offical	view	ot	the	Magyar	Nemzeti	Bank.maGYar nemZeti banK
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ConTrACTIonAry DEprECIATIon  
– FInDInGS oF EMpIrICAl STuDIES
the  financial  crises  of  the  1990s,  particularly  the  asian 
crisis, highlighted the fact that in emerging countries major 
episodes  of  exchange  rate  depreciations  are  often 
accompanied  by  serious,  protracted  recession.  this 
phenomenon  is  known  as  “contractionary  depreciation/
devaluation”  in  the  economic  literature.  although  the 
contractionary impact of the exchange rate may stem from a 
number of sources,1 starting from the 1990s the fact that the 
exchange rate worsens the balance sheets of economic agents 
with  heavy  Fx  debts  took  priority.  according  to  Frankel 
(2004), the Fx exposure recorded in the balance sheet plays 
a  major  role  in  the  process  where,  despite  significant 
depreciation in the real exchange rate, the adjustment of the 
balance  of  payments  typically  transpires  through  deep 
recession  (expenditure  reduction)  rather  than  economic 
restructuring,  i.e.  lower  consumption  and  export  growth 
(expenditure  switching).  reviewing  financial  crises  in 
emerging countries, reinhart and calvo (2000) claim that in 
currency  crises  exports  clearly  fall  in  the  first  8  months 
despite  major  depreciation  and  that  a  severe  recession 
ensues.  if  depreciation  is  also  accompanied  by  a  banking 
crisis,  the  decline  of  exports  ceases  only  after  the  20th 
month on average. the authors also concluded that this was 
primarily due to the Fx exposure in the balance sheets.
according  to  several  critics,  e.g.  magendzo  (2002),  the 
analyses  describing  the  correlation  between  depreciation 
and  economic  downturns  apply  the  term  ‘contractionary 
devaluation/depreciation’  misleadingly  and  excessively. 
major depreciation and a fall in output are often triggered 
by  the  same  variables,  which  are  not  discussed  in  the 
analyses (for example, an increase in foreign interest rates, 
a decrease in external demand, etc.). corresponding to this, 
de  Gregorio  and  lee  (2004)  concluded  that  the  fall  in 
output  resulting  from  depreciation  was  primarily  due  to 
external factors rather than to weakening exchange rates 
during the crisis period in asia and latin america (decreasing 
external demand, low central bank reserves, etc.).
analyses  which  control  for  the  variables  indicated  above 
and try to directly capture the role of Fx exposure in the 
impact of the exchange rate are less affected by the problem 
of endogeneity. according to most of these studies, it can 
also  be  empirically  concluded  that  Fx  debt  significantly 
reduces  the  expansionary  impact  of  the  exchange  rate, 
although  the  overall  impact  of  the  exchange  rate  was 
recessionary  only  in  a  few  number  of  cases  and  with 
significant Fx debt.
Similar  to  most  analyses,  cespedes  (2005)  examined  the 
contractionary  impact  of  the  exchange  rate  in  his 
econometric  analysis  of  82  countries  by  cross-product  of 
external debt and real exchange rate changes. according to 
his results, balance sheet effects have a significantly negative 
influence on the impact of the real exchange rate on the real 
economy. consequently, devaluation may cause a significant 
fall in output during the first two years in countries with a 
high  external  debt  and  a  sizeable  domestic  Fx  loan 
portfolio, as the competitive effect is delayed. Subsequently, 
however, the competitive effect is stronger and so over the 
medium  term  the  overall  impact  of  depreciation  may  be 
expansionary.  high  corporate  indebtedness  and,  within 
that, a high share of Fx loans, as well as a less developed 
financial system all amplify the contractionary impact of 
the exchange rate. in the econometric analysis conducted by 
bebczuk  et  al.  (2006),  depreciation  turned  out  to  be 
recessionary only in a small number of cases and in those 
countries where the Fx loans of the private sector accounted 
for over 84% of GdP.
the strength of contractionary impacts is influenced mostly 
by the vulnerability of the balance sheets of the economic 
actors. apart from Fx exposure, from the perspective of 
vulnerability, total indebtedness is also an important factor, 
as  it  influences  the  effectiveness  of  credit  constraints  on 
companies  and  households.  consequently,  higher 
indebtedness increases the probability of a contractionary 
impact (e.g. cespedes et al., 2004; Krugman, 1999).
in respect of vulnerability, the liquidity and capital position 
of the banking sector, the depth of financial intermediation 
and  global  liquidity  are  important  factors  (see  aghion, 
bachetta and banerjee, 2001; christiano, Gust and roldos, 
2004). these factors affect the way the external financing 
premium of companies/banks responds to changes in the 
balance sheets and the effectiveness of financing constraints.
the strength of contractionary impacts is also affected by 
the degree of depreciation (Krugman, 2001; eichengreen, 
2002; choi and cook, 2004). a larger shock is more likely 
to catch economic actors unaware, and it is less likely for 
buffers  to  be  available  to  mitigate  the  shock.  in  their 
econometric analysis, rajan and Shen (2001) concluded that 
devaluation  had  a  contractionary  impact  only  during 
exchange rate crises.
1		 In	emerging	countries	contractionary	depreciation	may,	in	addition	to	the	impacts	of	the	FX	debts	on	the	balance	sheet,	have	other	reasons,	e.g.	increasing	import	
prices	holding	back	capital	investments	(Cooper,	1971;	Edwards,	1987).mnb bulletin • march 2010 31
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empirical results are not conclusive as to whether high Fx 
debt itself increases the probability of financial crises/‘sudden 
stops’ (bordo et al., 2009; levy and Yeyati, 2006; calvo et 
al., 2008). On the other hand, analyses seem to agree that 
Fx debt increases the cost of financial crises. analysing 23 
financial  crisis  periods  during  the  1990s,  cavallo  et  al. 
(2002) showed that in a financial crisis countries with high 
external debt overshot their exchange rates and output in 
these countries fell by a larger extent than in countries with 
lower  external  debt.  analysing  over  300  financial  crisis 
periods during the 1980s and 1990s, Guidotti et al. (2004) 
found that a ‘sudden stop’ led to much higher output loss 
when Fx debt was also high.
a  group  of  what  is  called  third-generation  crisis  models 
developed as a response to the asian crisis (e.g., Krugman, 
1999; aghion et al., 2002; cespedes et al., 2003) describes 
the mechanism through which Fx exposure recorded in the 
balance sheet contributes to the development of a financial 
crisis.  these  models  capture  the  consequences  of  Fx 
lending with what is called the “open economy bernanke–
Gertler mechanism”, focusing on the Fx exposure recorded 
in  the  balance  sheets  of  companies  and/or  banks,  and 
financial  frictions.  in  conformity  with  the  assumption 
proposed by bernanke and Gertler (1989), in these models, 
access to external funds by banks and/or companies (the 
available quantity or risk premium) depends on their net 
worth.  depreciation  reduces  the  net  value  of  companies/
banks,  because  of  an  increase  in  the  value  of  Fx  debt 
expressed  in  the  local  currency,  and  thus  deteriorates 
profitability and access to external funds, leading to less 
capital investment and lower output.
the  open  economy  bernanke–Gertler  mechanism  may, 
ultimately,  trigger  a  self-fulfilling  currency  crisis  in  the 
majority  of  models,  pushing  the  economy  towards  a  bad 
equilibrium:  for  example,  erosion  of  foreign  investors’ 
confidence  leads  to  capital  outflows  and,  indirectly, 
depreciation,  resulting  in  less  capital  investment  and 
recession through balance sheet effects, thereby justifying 
deteriorating expectations.
another group of models points out that taking into account 
the feedback between risk premiums and the exchange rate, 
the question is not how the economy adjusts to a shock of a 
given magnitude, as in the case of a flexible exchange rate 
Fx debt amplifies the shock. in the model of choi and cook 
(2004)  for  example,  the  deterioration  of  banks’  balance 
sheets leads to a higher country risk premium and, indirectly, 
to further depreciation of the exchange rate, which again 
causes more deterioration in the balance sheets of banks, 
etc.  ultimately,  this  feedback  mechanism  results  in 
overshooting  of  the  exchange  rate,  and  much  higher  real 
exchange rate fluctuations than would be justified by the 
initial  real  shock,  which,  on  balance,  results  in  higher 
exchange rate volatility.
the time horizon of impacts on the real economy is another 
important  factor.  For  example,  as  is  also  emphasised  by 
cespedes (2005), Proano et al. (2006), balance sheet effects 
are  faster  than  the  competitiveness  effect,  and  therefore, 
concurrently with nominal depreciation, the decline may be 
greater in the first few years; a weaker real exchange rate, 
however, can even offset the initial negative effects over the 
longer  term.  another  long-term  issue  is  how  monetary 
policy  affects  the  Fx  exposure  recorded  in  the  balance 
sheets. With a monetary policy protecting the exchange rate 
(a more stable exchange rate, a higher and more volatile 
domestic  interest  rate),  the  incentives  for  Fx  lending 
restraining the impact of monetary policy may survive over 
the long run.
in  summary,  empirical  analyses  suggest  that  sizeable  Fx 
debt  or  external  debt  amplifies  the  impact  of  external 
shocks and weakens the role that nominal exchange rate 
plays in mitigating these shocks, making it more difficult for 
the economy to adjust and increasing the costs of financial 
crises.
BAlAnCE SHEET CHAnnElS In 
HunGAry
in  hungary,  the  Fx  exposure  of  the  private  sector  is 
somewhat different than in the asian and latin american 
countries  or  the  stylised  economy  depicted  in  the  third 
generation  crisis  models,  most  of  which  focus  on  the 
exposure recorded in corporate balance sheets. the Fx debt 
of companies is also high in hungary (31% of GdP at the 
end of 2008), yet it does not necessarily mean Fx exposure, 
given the high share of exports (85% of GdP). however, the 
household sector has high Fx debt, amounting to 25% of 
GdP at the end of 2008, which – considering the fact that 
household  income  is  generated  mostly  in  huF  –  does 
represent an exchange rate exposure. in addition, although 
the direct exchange rate risk of the banking sector is low, 
the exchange rate has a significant indirect impact on this 
sector via credit risks, because of unhedged household and 
domestic corporate Fx loans.
Stylized facts
Similarly to several other countries in the region, household 
indebtedness grew rapidly in the previous decade, primarily 
owning to a considerable rise in the Fx loans of households, 
extended mainly by domestic credit institutions and other 
financial  intermediaries  (see  chart  1).  concurrently,  the maGYar nemZeti banK
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ratio of households’ Fx assets to GdP remained unchanged, 
as  a  result  of  which  the  Fx  exposure  of  households 
increased considerably. in parallel with the increase in the 
household Fx loan portfolio, the ratio of debt service to 
disposable income also showed an increase.
Corporate sector
both corporate indebtedness and, within that, the share of 
Fx loans have also increased in recent decades, but not as 
markedly as in the case of household loans. the share of Fx 
loans within total corporate loans was already high, at over 
50% by the second half of the 1990s, rising to 65% by the 
end of 2008 (chart 2). in contrast to the household sector, 
it was not only loans from domestic credit institutions and 
financial intermediaries, but also loans directly from foreign 
institutions along with derivative transactions for hedging 
or speculative purposes that played an important role in the 
Fx exposure of the corporate sector. concerning Fx loans, 
a strong increase was observed in Fx loans extended by 
domestic banks and financial intermediaries, while the ratio 
of  Fx  loans  from  abroad  to  GdP  did  not  increase 
significantly. in contrast to household Fx loans, corporate 
loans do not necessarily represent Fx exposure thanks to 
export revenues and may even serve the purposes of natural 
hedging.
in hungary, no major exposure is observed when comparing 
the Fx position stated in the balance sheet of companies 
with net exports on an aggregate level. in recent years, an 
increase in the open position has been accompanied by an 
increase in net corporate exports (See chart 3), in line with 
the expansion of foreign trade. an international comparison 
of corporate Fx debt and exports shows a similar picture 
(See chart 4). although the Fx debt-to-GdP ratio of the 
hungarian  corporate  sector  is  significant,  the  debt-to-
exports ratio is much lower than in some countries affected 
by the financial crises of the 1990s. in principle, this may 
also  prove  that  in  hungary  high  corporate  Fx  debt  is 
attributable to the high export revenues of the corporate 
sector.
due  to  the  heterogeneity  of  companies,  an  aggregate 
comparison does not unequivocally reflect whether Fx debt 
does  in  fact  relate  to  companies  that  generate  export 
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Chart 2
Indebtedness of the non-financial corporate sector
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* Foreign loans also include shareholder loans.
Chart 3









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
as a percentage of GDP
Corporate sector net exports
Open position of non financial corporations
* The chart illustrates the loans of the non-financial corporate sector taken 
out from other domestic monetary institutions and from other financial 
intermediaries  and  from  foreign  institutions  (including  shareholder’s 
loans).  Net  corporate  exports  was  defined  as  exports  less  imports  for 
purposes other than consumption.
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revenues.  however,  a  few  stylized  facts  concerning 
corporate-level  exposure  indicate  that,  in  spite  of  a  high 
export ratio, there is no natural hedge behind a significant 
portion of corporate Fx loans.
a questionnaire-based survey conducted in the corporate 
sector  showed  sizeable  unhedged  currency  exposure 
(bodnár, 2009). using a sample of hundreds of small and 
large companies, the questionnaire also included questions 
on  the  Fx  composition  of  revenues,  expenditures  and 
balance  sheet  items  of  companies  (stock-  flow  exposure). 
the survey revealed that there is no natural hedge behind 
approximately 50% of the Fx loans of the non-financial 
corporate sector.
although  we  do  not  have  detailed  data  on  the  total  Fx 
position of certain sectors, comparing foreign and domestic 
Fx  loans  with  the  net  exports  of  the  sectors,  we  can 
conclude that it is not only sectors generating Fx revenues 
that incur Fx debts (See chart 5).2
except the manufacturing industry, all the other sectors are 
either  net  importers  or  neutral,  including  several  sectors 
with relatively high Fx debt compared with their sectoral 
added values. based on the Fx exposure-to-total GdP ratio, 
the marked Fx exposure of the real estates and economic 
services sector with no net exports may lead to vulnerability.3 
in addition, there may be significant balance sheet effects in 
the construction industry and in trade.4 
Overall,  although  aggregate  Fx  exposure  is  not  very 
significant,  for  certain  sectors  and  corporate  groups 
depreciation  may  significantly  deteriorate  the  companies’ 
balance sheets.
Banking sector
the direct Fx exposure of the banking sector is low, but 
changes in the exchange rate may still have an indirect 
impact  on  the  credit  supply  of  banks  through  various 
channels.  although  the  vulnerability  of  the  banking 
sector also stems from the Fx loans of the private sector, 
we should still analyse the impact of the exchange rate on 
the banking sector as a separate channel. One reason is 
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Chart 4
(Foreign and domestic) corporate Fx debt as a 
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* FX loans include the foreign and domestic FX bank loans of the various 
sectors, but do not include FDI-related loans. Net exports only include 
exported and imported goods, but not service exports and imports. Nor 
have imports for consumption purposes been excluded. Net exports have a 
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that the impact of the exchange rate on banks’ lending 
capacity  depends  not  only  on  the  existing  Fx  loan 
portfolio, but also on the capital and liquidity constraints 
faced  by  the  banking  sector  itself.  Furthermore,  an 
important feature of the lending channel is that the credit 
squeeze is general, affecting all debtors, not only those 
with Fx loans.
in  accordance  with  this,  in  hungary  the  exchange  rate 
affects the balance sheets of economic agents through three 
different, albeit interdependent channels. the balance sheet 
effects  in  turn  alter  the  consumption/investment/loan 
decisions  of  those  agents,  which  also  has  an  impact  on 
economic growth.
1)   The  household  balance  sheet  channel  and  the 
exchange rate
a)   exchange rate depreciation increases the huF value of 
the  monthly  instalments  of  Fx  loans,  which  reduces 
disposable income and, indirectly, consumption (income 
effect).
b)   a (permanent) depreciation increases the huF value of 
total debt, i.e. it reduces net wealth (wealth effect). in 
fact, we are not talking about two separate effects, as 
the wealth effect equals the sum of future repayments 
changes, i.e. that of future income effects. the reason 
why  it  should  still  be  highlighted  is  that  as  the 
consumption  effect  depends  on  exchange  rate 
expectations,  i.e.  the  extent  to  which  households 
consider an income shock to be permanent: if households 
expect  permanent  or  continuous  weakening,  they 
consequently  smooth  their  consumption  to  a  lesser 
extent and generate precautionary savings. if the loan 
defaults, wealth is lost irrespective of expectations, i.e. 
the wealth effect is stronger.
2)   The  corporate  balance  sheet  channel  and  the 
exchange rate
Similarly  to  household  loans,  the  depreciation  of  the 
exchange rate increases the huF value of companies’ Fx 
debt, but unlike the Fx debt of households, corporate Fx 
debt does not necessarily mean Fx exposure. One key issue 
in  relation  to  the  impact  of  corporate  Fx  lending  is  the 
availability of a natural hedge for Fx loans, i.e. the manner 
in  which  exchange  rate  movements  –  with  the  expected 
future  revenues  taken  into  account  –  affect  the  profit 
outlook and the value of companies.
For companies with revenues only in huF and Fx debts, 
depreciation  leads  to  lower  profits  and  lower  corporate 
value. net Fx debt can, however, also reduce the positive 
impact  of  higher  export  revenues,  even  in  the  case  of 
companies whose Fx debts are fully hedged with export 
revenues.
3) Credit supply channel of banks and the exchange 
rate
Weakening of the exchange rate influences the balance sheet 
of banks through several channels – not independently of 
the Fx debt of the private sector –, and, consequently also 
affects the credit supply of banks and growth.
despite a take-off in Fx lending, the total open Fx position 
of  the  hungarian  banking  sector,  excluding  banks  with 
active operations abroad, has been low and stable over the 
past years, and thus the exchange rate has a more indirect 
effect on the banking sector through the following channels.5 
a) Capital adequacy
in accordance with banking regulations, the risks assumed 
by banks must be limited by their capital. this is reflected 
by the so-called capital adequacy ratio (car), which is, to 
put it simply, the ratio of a bank’s capital to its risk-weighted 
assets. depreciation of the exchange rate exerts an impact 
on car through various channels. due to changes in the 
huF  value  of  Fx  loans,  it  increases  risk-weighted  total 
assets, i.e. the denominator of the capital adequacy ratio. 
this effect may be partially offset if certain components of 
the bank’s capital are also denominated in Fx (the numerator 
of car also changes). in addition, depreciation increases 
the default risk (more precisely the expected loan losses) of 
households  and  companies  with  Fx  loans,  but  with  no 
natural hedge. if the profit of the bank cannot cover the 
increased  loan  losses,  this  will  reduce  its  capital.  if  the 
capital adequacy ratio of banks falls below a critical level, 
they may decide to respond to this by reducing their lending 
activity. this is driven, in part, by the regulation, but it is 
also in the interest of banks to ensure that risks reflected by 
car do not exceed a certain level.
b) Liquidity
due to the maturity and currency mismatches of Fx assets 
and liabilities, depreciation leads to a deterioration of the 
liquidity position of banks, which may result in a decrease 
in credit supply.
5		 In	several	emerging	countries,	banks	run	direct	exchange	rate	risks,	i.e.	they	use	part	of	their	foreign	currency	resources	for	lending	in	the	local	currency,	thus	the	
exchange	rate	directly	reduces	the	bank’s	value	(e.g.,	Turkey,	2000–2001).mnb bulletin • march 2010 35
•   in the hungarian banking sector as a whole, Fx assets are 
covered  only  partly  by  foreign  and  parent  bank  Fx 
liabilities; while banks hedge the difference mainly with 
short-term Fx swaps. consequently, during the weakening 
of the exchange rate in early 2009, it was the renewal of 
short-term  currency  swaps  and  the  meeting  of  margin 
calls that primarily generated significant liquidity demand 
in the hungarian banking sector. Since then, banks have 
accumulated larger liquidity buffers and the instruments 
introduced by the mnb are likely to be able to handle 
potential  disturbances  in  the  operation  of  the  swap 
market.  all  these  developments  have  significantly 
improved the ability of the banking sector to withstand 
the shocks caused by sudden depreciation in the exchange 
rate. consequently, we do not think that the effect of this 
channel will have to be reckoned with in the near future.
•   however, over the longer term, the need to lower funding 
risk  and  exposure  to  external  financing,  and  the 
preservation or reduction of the high loan-to-deposit ratio 
in  the  banking  sector  may  lead  to  restraints  in  credit 
supply. the loan-to-deposit ratio reflects the reliance of 
banks  on  external  funds,  and  as  such,  it  may  also  be 
considered  one  of  the  indicators  of  liquidity  risk.  the 
loan-to-deposit ratio of the hungarian banking sector is 
high  by  international  standards,  suggesting  that  banks 
would  face  a  severe  shortage  of  funds  if  international 
resources dried up. the crisis motivated hungarian banks 
to modify their financing structure. most banks have set 
the objective of reducing the share of market funds, i.e. 
the  loan-to-deposit  ratio.  as  the  share  of  Fx  loans  is 
significantly  higher  than  that  of  Fx  deposits  for  most 
banks, depreciation of the nominal exchange rate directly 
increases the loan-to-deposit ratio, which may be offset by 
banks by reducing their lending activity.
consequently, if there are effective liquidity and/or capital 
constraints, exchange rate depreciation reduces the ability 
of banks to lend. it is important to emphasize that the credit 
squeeze  not  only  hits  Fx  debtors,  but  also  has  a  more 
general  impact.  moreover,  experience  shows  that  banks 
tend to first restrain their corporate lending usually with 
shorter maturity and a lower margin, even if the underlying 
reason for reduction is losses suffered on household loans.
c) Deterioration of debtors’ creditworthiness
in addition to the above reasons, banks may also restrain 
their  credit  supply  as  a  result  of  the  deteriorating 
creditworthiness  of  borrowers.  in  the  case  of  companies 
whose exchange rate exposure is high, depreciation reduces 
creditworthiness and increases the cost of external financing 
due to the fall in the company’s net worth, and also weakens 
the  willingness  of  banks  to  lend  to  such  companies.  (as 
discussed earlier, this is often the primary channel of third-
generation crisis models.) Similarly, a decline in net wealth 
also undermines the creditworthiness of households. thus, 
depreciation may shift the credit supply curve even if banks 
do not face liquidity or capital constraints. the direction of 
the shift in the supply curve, however, is not conclusive and 
may vary from sector to sector: e.g. in the case of companies 
in the exporting sector depreciation may reduce credit risks, 
while in the case of those providing market services it may 
increase credit risks.
Summary of the various effects
Summarising the various channels, we can conclude that the 
contraction triggered by balance sheet effects is a non-linear 
function  of  the  size  of  depreciation:  the  larger  the 
depreciation is, the higher the probability that the banking 
sector and Fx debtors will not have sufficient buffers to 
absorb the shock and that constraints become binding. With 
regard to the contractionary effect, we can identify at least 
three phases:
•   a significant increase in the ratio of non-performing loans 
may  lead  to  a  banking  crisis,  where  negative  output 
impacts could be immense.
•   however,  if  there  are  effective  liquidity  and  capital 
constraints,  the  reduction  in  credit  supply  due  to  the 
exchange rate change could offset the positive impact of 
depreciation on growth before the solvency of banks falls 
to a critical level.
•   the  effect  on  the  consumption  of  households  and  the 
profitability and assets of companies with unhedged Fx 
loans may undermine the positive effect of the exchange 
rate even without banks’ constraints becoming effective 
and before a default on loans; obviously, in this case the 
contractionary effect is much lower than in the previous 
cases.
in  addition  to  the  extent  of  depreciation,  contraction 
associated with balance sheet effects also depends on the 
initial liquidity constraints/capital position of the banking 
sector:  the  closer  the  banking  sector  is  to  the  minimum 
required capital adequacy ratio, and the more severe the 
liquidity constraints are, the lower the size of exchange rate 
depreciation required to noticeably influence credit supply. 
it is important to note that – in view of the existing credit, 
swap, etc. positions – one of the major factors influencing 
the constraints imposed by banks over the short term is the 
level of the exchange rate. the role of liquidity problems 
typically becomes truly significant during global financial 
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turbulences, and therefore, the credit supply channel can be 
particularly strong during periods of financial crises.
in addition, if weakening is fast and substantial, the self-
generating processes leading to even weaker exchange rates 
–  highly  emphasised  in  financial  literature  –  are  also 
relevant in hungary. Such processes result in a much larger 
depreciation than the initial exchange rate shock and lead to 
the overshooting of the exchange rate.
•   if  the  exchange  rate  weakens  to  a  level  at  which  it 
significantly increases the stability risks of the banking 
sector,  the  higher  probability  of  a  banking  crisis 
materialises in even higher risk premiums, which in turn 
weakens the exchange rate further, and further increases 
the probability of a banking crisis, etc.
•   likewise, if – in response to domestic actors’ losing their 
confidence in the forint and the banking sector – huF is 
converted  to  foreign  currencies,  this  will  put  further 
pressure on the exchange rate and amplify the impact of 
exchange rate weakening. in a more severe case, conversion 
is performed in cash, i.e. it reduces the deposit of banks, 
aggravating the liquidity position of the banking sector 
even further.
ESTIMATIon oF THE EFFECT oF 
BAlAnCE-SHEET CHAnnElS AnD 
ConCluSIonS
in addition to presenting simple stylised facts, we used our 
existing models to conduct partial simulations assessing the 
importance  of  balance-sheet  channels.  We  examined  the 
effect of exchange rate shocks of varying magnitudes. Our 
results provide a rough estimate of how the contractionary 
effect  of  the  balance-sheet  channels  modifies  our  former 
view of the impact of the exchange rate on the real economy, 
which is captured by the mnb’s quarterly projection model 
(QPm).
regarding  households’  Fx  loans,  we  relied  on  the 
consumption  function  of  the  QPm  model  and  estimated 
how loan repayments increased by exchange rate depreciation 
can  affect  the  disposable  income  of  households  and, 
indirectly, consumption and GdP.
as regards the corporate sector, we relied on survey-based 
and  sectoral  analysis-based  information  in  respect  of  the 
extent to which Fx loans were hedged, and estimated the 
effect  of  depreciation  on  the  profitability  and  capital 
investments of unhedged companies and, through this, on 
GdP.  We  used  two  methods.  in  the  QPm  model,  we 
interpreted the effect of changes in the exchange rate as a 
profit shock. in the investment model, which also takes into 
account  balance-sheet  effects,  we  captured  the  effect  of 
higher loan repayments on investments through changes in 
the cash flow. the two methods led to results of a similar 
magnitude.
Finally, on the basis of individual banking data and stress 
tests, published in the november 2009 report on Financial 
Stability,  we  also  analysed  the  effects  exerted  through 
banks’ balance sheets. First, we estimated the impact of an 
exchange rate shock on credit supply as a result of capital 
adequacy and loan/deposit constraints becoming effective. 
then, using a simple Var model, we gave an estimate on 
the  effect  on  the  real  economy  of  the  squeeze  in  credit 
supply  calculated  in  this  manner.  the  calculations  were 
made on the basis of September 2009 data, i.e. the results 
reflect the situation of the banking sector prevailing at that 
time.
On  the  basis  of  our  partial  model  calculations,  we  can 
conclude  that  the  contractionary  effects  of  a  weaker 
exchange rate depend significantly on how the depreciation 
affects the lending capacity of the banking sector. if we only 
take  into  account  the  effect  of  the  exchange  rate  on  the 
balance sheets of the private sector, then the competitiveness 
effect is stronger. however, the impact of depreciation on 
household income and the profitability of companies with 
Fx debts and no natural hedge absorbs approximately 50% 
of  the  expansionary  effect  stemming  from  improved 
competitiveness.  by contrast, if depreciation also reduces 
banks’  credit  supply,  then  the  sign  of  the  effect  of  the 
exchange  rate  on  the  real  economy  becomes  uncertain. 
according to our credit supply estimate, despite considerable 
improvement in recent months, based on September 2009 
data  of  the  banking  sector,  the  capital  and  liquidity 
constraints of the banking sector are still stretched to the 
extent that even a minor (approx. 10%) weakening of the 
exchange  rate  could  force  the  banking  sector  to  adjust. 
although  our  results  vary  within  a  wide  range,  if  the 
banking sector were to respond to the shock only by cutting 
back  its  lending  activities,  and  credit  supply  limits  were 
effective,  on  the  whole,  due  to  the  contraction  of  credit 
supply,  the  overall  effect  of  a  depreciation  could  be 
contractionary in the first two years. contractionary effects 
would  likely  be  stronger  than  expansionary  effects  if 
depreciation is larger.
We  would  like  to  emphasize  that  our  results  involve 
considerable  uncertainty.  On  the  one  hand,  we  assumed 
rather simplified banking behaviour, whereby banks’ only 
response  to  shocks  is  to  cut  back  their  credit  supply,  an 
assumption which overestimates the actual effect. a likely 
alternative reaction is a capital increase, in respect of which mnb bulletin • march 2010 37
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the  behaviour  of  parent  banks  is  critical.  loan/deposit 
constraints may be eased by aggressive deposit collection. 
On the other hand, the real effects of the reduction of credit 
supply may remain lower than our estimates if credit supply 
limits are not effective, for example because companies and 
households lower their credit demand anyway as a result of 
the  shocks  they  suffer.  in  addition,  some  companies 
(typically  large,  export-oriented  or  foreign-owned 
companies) may also raise funds from other sources instead 
of relying on domestic bank loans, while better-capitalised 
banks  may  easily  snatch  up  the  customers  of  banks 
restraining credit supply.
in  summary,  in  the  current  situation  balance  sheets  are 
vulnerable enough for the contractionary effects to eliminate 
most of the stimulating impact of exchange rate depreciation. 
the likely outcome of this is that the ability of a potential 
nominal  depreciation  to  ease  a  recession  will  be  rather 
limited in the future.
the credit supply effect of the exchange rate should, at least 
in  such  a  strong  form,  be  considered  a  temporary 
phenomenon  associated  with  the  crisis.  in  parallel  with 
consolidation  of  the  global  financial  environment  and 
improvement in the capital position and profit prospects of 
the  banking  sector,  the  credit  supply  channel  is  also 
expected  to  attenuate.  this  is  supported  by  the  latest, 
better-than-expected data on the profitability and capital 
position of the banking sector at end 2009.
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